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KATHRYN H. CLARKE* 
Foreword: Fundamental Rights or 
Paper Tigers? 
hy arrange a symposium in the wake of the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s decision in Horton v. Oregon Health & Science 
University?1 To some of us, the answer may seem so obvious that the 
question borders on the inane, but the process of answering it helped 
clarify for me the assistance that such a discussion can provide to the 
litigants who address, and the courts that resolve, the issues presented 
by Horton. 
 
* Kathryn Clarke received a BA from Whitman College in 1966, an MA in English 
from Portland State University in 1975, and her JD from Northwestern School of Law at 
Lewis and Clarke College in 1979. Since then she has been a solo practitioner representing 
injured people in the appellate courts and consulting with trial court practitioners regarding 
legal issues. She has been a member of the board of governors of the Oregon Trial 
Lawyers Association (OTLA) for almost twenty-eight years, serving as president of the 
organization in 1995–96; she is currently one of OTLA’s representatives to the board of 
governors of the American Association for Justice. She is a trustee and past president of 
the Roscoe Pound Civil Justice Institute, and since 1998 has served as a discussion group 
leader or panel participant in the Institute’s annual Forum for State Court Appellate 
Judges. In 2006 she was honored as Distinguished Trial Lawyer by the Oregon Trial 
Lawyers Association. In 2016 she was honored by the Pound Civil Justice Institute for her 
achievements as an appellate advocate. 
 The author acknowledges a personal component to the comments that follow; she was 
appellate counsel on Greist v. Phillips and Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., as well as many of 
the cases that followed. She is now preparing the response to the first petition for Oregon 
Supreme Court review of a post-Horton decision. 
1 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
W
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FROM “TORT REFORM” TO LAKIN V. SENCO PRODUCTS, INC. 
It is necessary to begin by summarizing how we got to Horton. In 
1987, the Oregon legislature enacted a package of “tort reforms” that 
included a $500,000 limit on the recovery of noneconomic damages 
in a civil action for personal injury, death, or property damage.2 
Seven years later, in an action for malicious prosecution, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation, a jury 
awarded the plaintiff in Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co. $900,000 in 
noneconomic damages and $2566 in economic damages.3 Despite 
ORS 31.710, the trial judge denied the defendant’s motion to reduce 
the noneconomic damages award to $500,000 when entering 
judgment.4 The court of appeals, in a decision en banc, affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court, holding that the Oregon Constitution’s 
reexamination clause5 prohibited the court from reexamining and 
setting aside a verdict that is supported by the evidence. The case was 
then settled, and defendant’s petition for review by the Supreme 
Court was dismissed.6 
Two months later, that same year, the court of appeals applied 
Tenold and article VII (amended), section 3, to a wrongful death 
action, holding that reducing the jury’s award of noneconomic 
damages from $1.5 million to one-third that amount violated the state 
constitution.7 In 1995, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed that 
decision.8 The supreme court rejected arguments that the reduction 
violated the remedy clause (because one-third of the verdict was 
nonetheless “substantial”), or offended the right to jury trial (because 
in 1857, a judge could apply remittitur to an “excessive” verdict). The 
supreme court also disagreed with the court of appeals’ application of 
the reexamination clause because that provision limited the power of 
 
2 1987 Or. Laws ch. 774, § 6 (now codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710). See Nadia 
Dahab, Oregon’s History on Caps and the Outlook after Horton, 96 OR. L. REV. 621 
(2018), for a summary of the legislative history of the enactment. 
3 Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 127 Or. App. 511, 513, 873 P.2d 413, 415 (1994). 
4 Id. at 518, 873 P.2d at 418. 
5 Article VII (amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in relevant 
part: “In actions at law, where the value in controversy exceeds $750, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the 
verdict.” OR. CONST. art. VII, §3 (amended 1996). 
6 Tenold v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 321 Or. 561, 901 P.2d 859 (1995). 
7 Greist v. Phillips, 128 Or. App. 390, 875 P.2d 1199 (1994), rev’d, 322 Or. 281, 906 
P.2d 789 (1995). 
8 Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 906 P.2d 789 (1995). 
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the court, not the power of the legislature, and because wrongful 
death was a statutory cause of action that originally had been created 
with a limitation on recovery.9 
But then in 1999, the Oregon Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc.10 There, the Oregon Supreme Court 
ruled that the constitutional right to a jury trial prohibited application 
of the cap on noneconomic damages to a verdict for personal injury 
and loss of consortium arising out of negligent failure to warn and 
strict product liability in the design and manufacture of a nail gun.11 
Quoting a 1987 opinion that invalidated a statute requiring a binding 
appraisal of an insurance policy dispute, the court said that article I, 
section 17, “guarantees a jury trial ‘in those classes of cases in which 
the right was customary at the time the [Oregon] constitution was 
adopted or in cases of like nature.’”12 That proposition was reiterated 
in its summary of the rationale for its conclusion: 
 In summary, Article I, section 17, guarantees a jury trial in civil 
actions for which the common law provided a jury trial when the 
Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857 and in cases of like 
nature. In any such case, the trial of all issues of fact must be by 
jury. The determination of damages in a personal injury case is a 
question of fact. The damages available in a personal injury action 
include compensation for noneconomic damages resulting from the 
injury. The legislature may not interfere with the full effect of a 
jury’s assessment of noneconomic damages, at least as to civil cases 
in which the right to jury trial was customary in 1857, or in cases of 
like nature.13 
Lakin was a huge victory for injured Oregonians. At least as to 
common law injury actions, it seemed settled that the noneconomic 
damages cap would not interfere between verdict and judgment. 
 
9 Id. at 297, 906 P.2d at 798. 
10 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463 (1999), overruled by Horton v. 
Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
11 The court of appeals applied the rationale of Tenold, taking the position that the 
supreme court in Greist “carefully and specifically limited its analysis [under Article VII 
(amended), section 3,] to ‘wholly statutory’ rights of action” such as wrongful death, and 
therefore Tenold was still good law in a common law action. Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 
144 Or. App. 52, 79, 925 P.2d 107, 123 (1996). 
12 Lakin, 329 Or. at 69, 987 P.2d at 468 (quoting Molodyh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 304 Or. 
290, 295, 744 P.2d 992, 996 (1987)). 
13 Id. at 82, 987 P.2d at 475 (citations omitted). 
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THEN CAME SMOTHERS V. GRESHAM TRANSFER 
Two years later, in 2001, the supreme court held, in Smothers v. 
Gresham Transfer, Inc., that where the workers’ compensation statute 
imposed a heightened causation requirement (a claimant had to 
establish that the work exposure was the “major contributing cause” 
of an occupational disease, not simply a substantial contributing 
cause), the workers’ common law claim against his employer was not 
barred by the “exclusive remedy” provision of the workers’ 
compensation statute.14 Because the plaintiff “would have had a 
common law cause of action when the drafters wrote the Oregon 
Constitution in 1857,” and because there was no remedy available 
under the workers’ compensation law, the plaintiff’s negligence 
action must be allowed to proceed.15 
Smothers appeared to be a breakthrough in establishing an effective 
limitation on lobbyists’ and legislators’ efforts to confine, or 
foreclose, common law remedies. But the opinion unfortunately 
focused on “absolute rights” as they existed in 1857, when the Oregon 
Constitution was enacted, and not on the concept of the common law 
as capable of evolving to meet new conditions. Thus, it was equipped 
with an escape clause: if a plaintiff could not establish that a claim of 
the precise nature alleged was available 150 years ago, then perhaps 
no remedy was constitutionally guaranteed. 
Unfortunately, Lakin’s articulation of the jury trial right had 
language capable of raising the same difficulties. Lakin, as quoted 
above, spoke of “actions for which the common law provided a jury 
trial when the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857,”16 instead of 
reiterating its earlier reference to “classes of cases in which the right 
was customary in 1857”17 and making the precise historical lineage of 
a particular claim appear critical to the existence of a right to a jury 
trial. The tagalong reference to cases “of like nature,” which appeared 
in both the Lakin and the Molodyh formulations, could easily be 
overlooked or found ambiguous. 
 
14 Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 89, 23 P.3d 333, 337 (2001), 
overruled by Horton 359 Or. at 376 P.3d at 998. 
15 Id. at 135, 23 P.3d at 362. 
16 Lakin, 329 Or. at 82, 987 P.2d at 475. 
17 Molodyh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 304 Or. 290, 295, 744 P.2d 992, 996 (1987) (emphasis 
added). 
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SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION 
Indeed, these problems were reflected in the appellate opinions in 
subsequent litigation. In Lawson v. Hoke,18 the Oregon Supreme 
Court held that a statute eliminating any recovery of noneconomic 
damages by a person who was driving without insurance when he was 
injured by the negligence of another driver did not violate the remedy 
clause because “no ‘absolute common right’ that existed when the 
Oregon Constitution was drafted in 1857 would have guaranteed 
plaintiff a remedy for her injuries–either economic or noneconomic–
under the circumstances of this case.”19 That statement ignored, of 
course, the fact that the law recognized such a right in 1999, when the 
statute was enacted. 
In Hughes v. Peacehealth,20 a wrongful death action, the supreme 
court carved out an exception to Lakin’s invalidation of the cap. 
Because the common law does not, and did not in 1857, “recognize a 
right to unlimited damages in wrongful death actions,” any 
constitutional “right to a jury trial that plaintiff might have . . . cannot 
confer a right to a jury award of a kind or amount of damages that is 
contrary to that statutory law.”21 The same reasoning disposed of the 
remedy clause challenge: plaintiff failed to establish “that 
the statutory damages cap . . . abolishes a remedy that was available at 
common law”22 when the constitution was enacted, and therefore 
plaintiff had no right to a remedy under article I, section 10. 
In Christiansen v. Providence Health System,23 the court of appeals 
held that a child who suffered prenatal injuries was not denied a 
constitutionally protected remedy by a provision that radically 
reduced minority tolling of the statute of limitations for medical 
negligence claims, because no claim for prenatal injuries caused by 
medical negligence was recognized by the common law of Oregon 
when the Oregon Constitution was adopted. That case raised the 
specter that constitutional protections could simply disappear as 
human knowledge advanced. 
 
18 Lawson v. Hoke, 339 Or. 253, 265, 119 P.3d 210, 216 (2005). 
19 Id. 
20 Hughes v. Peacehealth, 344 Or. 142, 178 P.3d 225 (2008). 
21 Id. at 157, 178 P.3d at 234. 
22 Id. at 152, 178 P.3d at 231. 
23 Christiansen v. Providence Health Sys. of Or. Corp., 210 Or. App. 290, 150 P.3d 50 
(2006), aff’d on other grounds, Christiansen v. Providence Health Sys. of Or. Corp., 344 
Or. 445, 184 P.3d 1121 (2008). 
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And indeed, in 2011, the court of appeals relied on Christiansen to 
hold that because an action for prenatal injuries caused by medical 
negligence had not been recognized by the common law in 1857 and 
was not “of like nature” to other medical negligence claims, applying 
the cap on noneconomic damages did not violate the plaintiff’s right 
to a jury trial.24 A few years later, the supreme court reversed that 
decision.25 But it did so after framing the constitutional question, for 
both the remedy clause and the jury trial right, as “reduce[d] to 
whether, in 1987, the common law recognized a claim for the type of 
injuries that occurred in this case.”26 The court began with the 
proposition that the common law “has recognized a cause of action 
for negligence since at least the adoption of the American 
Revolution,” and that “a cause of action for medical malpractice 
preexisted the adoption of the Oregon Constitution.”27 But it took a 
fairly lengthy discussion for the court to conclude that the plaintiff’s 
claim did not fall within any recognized “exception” to those 
propositions before ruling that “[b]ecause an action for medical 
malpractice is one for which ‘the right to jury trial was customary in 
1857,’” the limitation on the jury’s determination of damages could 
not be enforced.28 The analysis that the opinion used seemed to make 
future litigation, focused primarily on whether constitutional 
protections even applied, inevitable. 
But the year before gave us M.K.F. v. Miramontes,29 a statutory 
action for a stalking protective order and compensatory money 
damages, where the court held that the parties were entitled to a jury 
trial on the damages claim. The reasoning? Article I, section 17, and 
article VII (amended), section 3, both “preserve the right to jury trial 
for claims that are properly categorized as ‘civil’ or ‘at law;’” 
plaintiff’s statutory claim “seeking monetary damage for injury 
inflicted fits within those terms, even if it does not have a precise 
historical analog.”30 Therefore, the parties had a right to a jury 
determination on the damages issue.31 The Miramontes opinion, 
 
24 Klutschkowski v. Peacehealth, 245 Or. App. 524, 263 P.3d 1130 (2010), rev’d en 
banc, 354 Or. 150, 311 P.3d 461 (2013). 
25 Klutschkowski v. Peacehealth, 354 Or. 150, 311 P.3d 461 (2013). 
26 Id. at 169, 311 P.3d at 472. 
27 Id. at 171, 311 P.3d at 472. 
28 Id. at 176–77, 311 P.3d at 476. 
29 M.F.K. v. Miramontes, 352 Or. 401, 287 P.3d 1045 (2012). 
30 Id. at 426, 287 P.3d at 1058. 
31 Id. 
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issued after briefing and argument in Klutschkowski, was not 
mentioned in the majority opinion. 
Both cases affected a court of appeals’ opinion rejecting 
complaints that Lakin’s principles could not be applied to a plaintiff’s 
verdict on a product liability claim because contributory fault and the 
lack of privity would have prevented common law recovery in 1857. 
In Vasquez v. Double Press Manufacturing, Inc., the court said that 
“Miramontes and Klutschkowski confirm that the Supreme Court 
rejected ‘precise historical analogs’ from 1857 to determine a party’s 
right to jury trial.”32 Finally, seventeen years after the Lakin opinion, 
we had some assurance that there was an end in sight to the ongoing 
battles about which cases could rely on Lakin to abrogate the cap on 
noneconomic damages as violating the right to jury trial. 
The Vasquez opinion issued on May 4, 2016. 
AND THEN THERE WAS HORTON 
The very next morning, on May 5, 2016, the Oregon Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in Horton, which overruled Lakin in its 
entirety.33 Article I, section 17, the court said, “guarantees a 
procedural right, . . . the right to a trial by a jury (as opposed to trial 
by a judge) in civil actions.”34 But it does not limit “the legislature’s 
authority to define, as a matter of law, the substantive elements of a 
cause of action or the extent to which damages will be available in 
that action.”35 
While it is true that legislatures can redefine the common law, 
article I, section 17, nonetheless guarantees the right to have a jury 
apply that law to the facts and resolve the differences between the 
parties. The court made no attempt to explain how a statute that tells a 
judge to enter a judgment that is inconsistent with the jury’s 
application of the law to the facts leaves the jury trial right intact and 
meaningful. Under Horton, it would seem that the jury trial can 
become a mere formality without offending the constitutional 
guarantee. 
Horton also overruled Smothers, the case that really dug us into the 
“1857 syndrome.” It did so without reinterpreting the clause to 
 
32 Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 278 Or. App. 77, 86, 372 P.3d 605, 610 (2016), 
withdrawn and superseded on reconsideration by, 288 Or. App. 503, 406 P.3d 225 (2017). 
33 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
34 Id. at 243, 376 P.3d at 1040. 
35 Id. 
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guarantee only access to the courts rather than a substantive remedy 
for injury. It did not suggest, as it had with the jury trial right, that the 
clause merely addressed procedure but did not guarantee it would 
have substantive meaning. However, Horton addressed a different 
statute, the Oregon Tort Claims Act, where a waiver of sovereign 
immunity can be understood to provide an offsetting benefit to a 
limitation on recovery. It left us with no clear roadmap of the analysis 
necessary to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the remedy 
clause is violated by applying the cap on noneconomic damages. 
SO WHY THE SYMPOSIUM? 
In the wake of this seismic event, it seemed appropriate, and even 
necessary, to take a second look at what happened over the past thirty 
years, since the cap on noneconomic damages became a feature of tort 
litigation. While it felt like starting over to those of us who represent 
injured persons, Horton provoked a determination to avoid the 
mistakes of the past. It was time, in other words, for a fresh look at 
the legal principles we are attempting to apply. 
As critical as it is for any attorney to focus on the facts of the case 
at hand, that very approach may breed difficulties due to a limitation 
in perspective, or a choice in posturing issues, or a terminology and 
language selected for reasons of advocacy but lacking a clear view of 
their implications. In turn, this can affect the court’s approach to the 
issue presented, and therefore, the arguments and approaches by 
advocates and the court in subsequent cases. A symposium such as 
this one offers a chance to step back and reevaluate the issues. 
Ultimately, what we hoped for and gained from the symposium 
presentations and these law review articles is an approach to these 
critical constitutional questions that will avoid creating other 
conceptual difficulties like the ones we experienced over the last two 
decades. 
SINCE THE HORTON SYMPOSIUM 
Since we hosted this symposium, the court of appeals issued its 
first post-Horton ruling regarding the cap on noneconomic damages. 
In Vasquez v. Double Press Manufacturing,36 the same court that 
ruled the day before Horton that applying the cap would violate the 
right to jury trial, held that applying the cap in that case violated the 
 
36 Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 288 Or. App. 503, 406 P.3d 225 (2017) 
(Vasquez II). 
CLARKE (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2018  11:57 AM 
2018] Foreword: Fundamental Rights or Paper Tigers? 487 
remedy clause. Mr. Vasquez, who was paraplegic as the result of his 
injury, had been awarded $8,100,000 in noneconomic damages, a 
figure that was reduced to $4,860,000 by his comparative fault. The 
court held that applying the cap and reducing his recovery to 
$500,000 would leave him with “only a ‘paltry fraction’ of the 
damages that he sustained and would otherwise recover,” and 
therefore would deny him a substantial remedy.37 In Rains v. Stayton 
Builders Mart, Inc.,38 the court of appeals held that the cap could not 
be applied to reduce the injured husband’s award from $2,343,750 in 
noneconomic damages to $500,000, or the wife’s loss of consortium 
award from $759,375 to $500,000. The court explained that it could 
not see “a principled reason to conclude” that such a reduction would 
leave the plaintiffs with a “substantial” remedy.39 
A petition for supreme court review was filed in Vasquez on 
January 8, 2018, and a petition in Rains will undoubtedly be filed as 
well. The constitutional litigation we anticipated when we read the 
Horton decision is already upon us. We believe we are much better 
prepared for that process as a result of the perspectives and insights 
provided by this symposium. 
  
 
37 Id. at 525–26, 406 P.3d at 237. 
38 Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 289 Or. App. 672 (2018). 
39 Id. at 692. 
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